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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Supreme Court’s seminal 1975 decision, Goss v. Lopez, the 
Court held: 
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that 
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he 
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story.1
 * Perry A. Zirkel, University Professor of Education and Law, Lehigh University.  
 ** Assistant High School Principal, Southern Lehigh School District.  Graduate 
student, Lehigh University. 
 1. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).  In contrast to suspensions of ten days or less, the 
Court only addressed the application of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process 
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In his dissent to the Goss decision, writing on behalf of three other 
members of the Court, Justice Powell countered: 
The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable 
to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools.  
It justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and 
secondary education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right of a 
student not to be suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due 
process hearing either before or promptly following the suspension.2
The majority’s holding and the dissent’s criticism provide the foundational 
framework for the continuing rhetoric and more recent research concerning 
procedural constraints on student suspensions in public schools. 
The purpose of this Article is to provide a systematic synthesis of the 
myriad state procedural due process provisions for suspensions of one to 
ten days.  The results will contribute to determining whether federal 
courts, as compared with state legislatures, are the appropriate arena for 
resolving any perceived problems. 
II. THE RHETORIC AND RESEARCH
Criticism of the Goss ruling began in the wake of Justice Powell’s 
dissent3 and continues to the present day.4  During this time, the mass 
media,5 political spokespersons,6 special interest groups,7 and education 
to lengthier exclusions with this brief dictum: “Longer suspensions or expulsions for the 
remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”  Id.
at 584. 
2. Id. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell reasoned that Ohio’s statute, 
which required parents to be provided with written notice of the suspension and the 
reasons for the suspension within twenty-four hours, was amply sufficient—and possibly 
superior to the majority’s constitutional ruling—to avoid the risk of arbitrary 
administrative action.  Id. at 596. 
3. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the 
School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 863–64 (1976); Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez:
Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 662 (1977); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SUP.
CT. REV. 25, 46. 
4. See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL 
AUTHORITY 38, 63 (2003); Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, From the Schoolhouse to the 
Courthouse: School Discipline and the Law, in FROM BROWN TO BONG HITS: ASSESSING 
A HALF CENTURY OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION (Joshua Dunn & Martin 
West eds., forthcoming 2009); Julie Underwood, Commentary, The 30th Anniversary of 
Goss v. Lopez, 198 EDUC. L. REP. 795, 798–803 (2005); Richard Arum, For Their Own 
Good: Limit Students’ Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A17; George F. Will, 
Schools Beset by Lawyers and Shrinks, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A33. 
5. See, e.g., ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: ORDER AND 
AUTONOMY 114 (1984) (citing negative predictions in education publications such as 
Kirp, supra note 3, and Wilkinson, supra note 3).  For an example of the press’s 
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publications8 reinforced the perception of Goss and its lower court 
progeny as disabling school discipline.  Recently, though, a counterbalancing 
view has started to emerge.  For example, in her article commemorating 
the thirtieth anniversary of the Goss decision, Julie Underwood initially 
followed the lead of the Powell dissent, commenting that “[b]y making 
student discipline a constitutional issue, by elevating it to a ‘federal 
issue,’ the court has left educators fumbling away through their daily 
disciplinary dealings with students wondering and working at their 
peril.”9  However, despite this contention, Underwood at least partially 
recognized that the ultimate problem is a matter of state law: “Certainly 
the three minute due process [outlined in Goss] is still within 
constitutional limits.  Since control of the schools rests in the hands of 
state legislatures, it would be up to them to enact such [limited 
suspension requirements] in their states.”10
sensationalizing and selectively covering suspension and expulsion due process cases, 
see Perry A. Zirkel, The Midol Case, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 803, 803–04 (1997). 
 6. David Schimmel & Richard Williams, Does Due Process Interfere with School 
Discipline?, 68 HIGH SCH. J. 47, 48 (1985) (referencing Gary Bauer, the former presidential 
assistant who was then-Chairman of the Federal Working Group on School Violence and 
Discipline, and his belief that Goss “deprive[s] school administrators of the tools they 
need to control school violence”). 
 7. The current leading organization on this subject is Common Good.  See, e.g.,
PUBLIC AGENDA, “I’M CALLING MY LAWYER”: HOW LITIGATION, DUE PROCESS AND 
OTHER REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ARE AFFECTING PUBLIC EDUCATION 11 (2003), 
http://commongood.org/assets/attachments/96.pdf; see also Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing 
Fear? Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of Law on Education, 35 J.L. &
EDUC. 461, 466–70 (2006) (scrutinizing Common Good’s research studies).  For a 
summary of the previous efforts of other such interest groups, see, for example, Perry A. 
Zirkel, Commentary, The Coverdell Teacher Protection Act: Immunization or Illusion?,
179 EDUC. L. REP. 547, 547–51 (2003). For a more recent forum that included finger 
pointing at Goss, see Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, From Brown to “Bong 
Hits”: Assessing a Half-Century of Judicial Involvement in Education (Oct. 15, 2008), 
http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1746/event_detail.asp. 
 8. Henry Lufler, Jr., The School of Law Litigation Explosion: A Specious 
Generalization 1–2 (Nov. 1988) (unpublished paper presented at the annual conference 
of the National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, on file with author) 
(attributing this reinforcing tendency to a slowness in education law commentators’ 
recognition of changes in litigation patterns). 
 9. Underwood, supra note 4, at 803. 
10. Id. at 805–06.  Underwood also partially hit the target via a shotgun-like 
accusation against state legislatures and “the state agencies, the school boards, the 
administrators, and even the courts [for] expand[ing] the minimal due process set forth in 
Goss, making the process much more complex and legalistic than originally set out by 
the Court.”  Id. at 798. 
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A pair of recent studies successively found that the procedural 
constraints on student suspensions were more a matter of state law than 
the Goss decision.  In the first study, Youssef Chouhoud and Perry Zirkel 
empirically analyzed the frequency and outcomes of Goss progeny, 
defined as lower court rulings based on procedural due process (PDP) 
specific to school student suspensions and expulsions.11  They found that 
the frequency of these rulings increased from 1986 to 2000 and then 
leveled off from 2000 to 2005, but that during this entire period, the 
outcomes overwhelmingly favored school districts, and the relatively 
few student victories were largely limited to rulings based on state laws 
that expanded the Goss holding.12  The authors concluded:
[C]ontrary to the position of the various commentators and the mass media, 
Goss is not responsible for a dramatic expansion of students’ PDP rights.  
Although the Goss dissent was partially correct to the extent that the lower court 
progeny has amounted to a rising tide, although not a flood, the results of this 
study disprove the dissent’s accompanying prediction of judicial activism.  The 
primary source of any expansion of the Goss decision is not the judiciary, from 
the Goss Court to the federal and state courts that have interpreted its decision, 
but state codes, either in the form of legislation or regulation.13
In a follow-up analysis, Chouhoud and Zirkel found that (1) federal 
law rulings—those based on Fourteenth Amendment PDP, which was 
the fulcrum for Goss—were significantly more skewed in favor of 
school districts than were state law rulings; (2) rulings for suspensions—
which are also more closely connected to Goss—were significantly more 
skewed in favor of school districts than were rulings for expulsions; and 
(3) federal rulings—as compared with state law rulings—for suspensions 
were significantly more skewed in favor of school districts, and none of 
these “pure” Goss rulings were conclusively in favor of the plaintiff 
student.14  As a result, the authors of the study recommended, inter alia,
“[f]ollow-up research to provide systematic data as to which state laws 
merely codify the Goss holding for suspensions and the extent to which 
the others expand it.”15
This study is intended as the recommended follow-up, and it provides 
a systematic survey of state laws for Goss suspensions—those of ten 
 11. Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353, 354–63 (2008).  For the specific scope of their sample, see 
id. at 363–66.  They started their case coverage in 1986 because previous PDP studies 
had found that Goss had not led to an explosion of litigation and that the outcomes did 
not move at all in favor of students.  Id. at 358–59 (citing Lufler, supra note 8, at 5). 
12. Id. at 378, 381–82. 
13. Id. at 382 (footnotes omitted). 
 14. Perry A. Zirkel & Youssef Chouhoud, The Goss Progeny: A Follow-Up 
Outcomes Analysis, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009). 
15. Id.
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days or less—in terms of their procedural requirements.  The entries in 
the tabular analysis differentiate between codifications and expansions 
of the Goss requirements.
III. METHOD
In light of the various requirements for procedural due process that 
each state provides through its legislation or regulation, it is important 
first to establish the specific scope of this survey.  In limiting the study 
to Goss suspensions, state law procedural requirements for removals of 
more than ten days—whether termed “suspensions” or “expulsions”—
have been excluded.  Similarly, in limiting the study to Goss protections, 
substantive state law provisions for suspensions of up to ten days—the 
specific grounds for such suspensions and the requirements for alternative 
education placements or the right to make up work—have also been 
excluded.16  Additionally, the study was limited to suspensions from school, 
thus excluding state law provisions concerning in-school suspensions, 
teacher-imposed removals from class, and timeouts.17  Finally, and 
also in line with Goss, the study’s scope was limited to regular education 
in public school settings, thereby excluding the specialized procedural 
protections under state and federal law for removals of students with 
disabilities.18
Next, within the scope of the study, a variety of search strategies 
ensured comprehensive coverage.  Specifically, the primary sources of 
the study’s search were (1) the websites for state education agencies and 
state legislatures; (2) the “Recent State Policies/Activities” feature of the 
16. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2(a)(5) (2008) (requiring that 
suspended students be provided make up work); TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.0051, 
37.008, 37.011 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008) (requiring placement in disciplinary or 
juvenile justice alternative education programs).  Other states enacted special substantive 
requirements for suspensions.  See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2(a)(4) (2007) 
(mandating supervision of the student while waiting for the student’s parent to remove 
the student from school during the school day); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(b) (2007) 
(containing provisions for textbooks, homework, and tests). 
17. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738(b), (c) (2005) (teacher removals from 
class); 22 PA. CODE § 12.7 (2009) (in-school suspensions). 
 18. For the relevant regulatory requirements and case law on the federal level, see, 
for example, Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline of Students with Disabilities: A Judicial Update,
235 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2008), and Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions of Students 
with Disabilities: The Latest Requirements, 214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007), and see also 
Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions Under Section 504: A Comparative 
Overview, 226 EDUC. L. REP. 9 (2008). 
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Education Commission of the States for “Safety/Student Discipline—
Expulsion/Suspension”;19 and (3) the Westlaw database for supplementation 
and verification.20
Finally, a comprehensive table—provided herein as the Appendix—
served to synthesize the variations of the Goss theme within the specific 
boundaries of the study.  The first two columns follow the Goss
foundational framework of notice and hearing, with the entries “x” 
representing explicit codifications of the associated Goss requirements 
(for example, oral notice of the charges and a conditional hearing if the 
student denies the charges as the minimum).21  A blank entry for the 
notice and hearing columns specific to students is an entirely implicit 
indication of the same minimum level of procedural protection, given the 
Constitution-based effect of the Supreme Court’s unchanged decision.22
For the first two columns, an unshaded entry of “x” represents a 
similar, relatively low level of procedural obligation beyond Goss, such 
as oral notice to the student’s parents, the school district superintendent, 
or both, whereas an “X” represents a more formal level of procedural 
obligation beyond the Goss minimum, such as the required addition or 
alternative of written notice,23 or a hearing not conditioned on the student’s 
denial.24  The final three columns in the Appendix represent further and 
sometimes much more significant additions to the Goss procedural 
prerequisites, with the “X” entries for the “Additional Levels” column 
meriting special attention.25  The other more limited entry variations 
19. See Educ. Comm’n of the States, Recent State Policies/Activities, http://www. 
ecs.org/ecs/ecscat.nsf/WebTopicView?OpenView&count=-1&RestrictToCategory=Safety/ 
Student+Discipline--Expulsion/Suspension (last visited Apr. 23, 2009). 
 20. In the few cases in which a Westlaw search did not reveal an otherwise 
referenced provision or the particular provision was difficult to interpret, a state 
education law expert was e-mailed for assistance.  See infra notes 52, 72, 89, 176.  For 
example, in the Texas law, the definition of suspension—a removal of one to three days, 
with removals beyond three days termed “expulsions”—is distinguishable from its 
meaning in most states.  See infra note 176. 
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 22. In contrast, as shown in the key accompanying the table presented on the title 
page of the Appendix, a bracketed entry designates some other implied entry based 
indirectly on the language of—as contrasted with silence in—the state law.  See infra 
notes 59, 69 and accompanying table. 
 23. Where the statute or regulation provided for “oral or written notice,” the entry 
is only “x,” which corresponds to the same optional—rather than required—written 
notice in Goss.  Where the state law provided for written notice rather than, or as a required 
addition to, oral notice, the entry in the Notice column is “X” or “x, X,” respectively. 
 24. Inasmuch as the Appendix provides for two Hearing columns corresponding to 
the two required elements of the hearing referenced in Goss, the entries may vary as to 
whether the explanation of the evidence or the student’s side of the story is expressly 
conditional on the student’s denial of the charges. 
 25. For example, Pennsylvania provides for two levels of suspension: one to three 
days and four to ten days.  See infra note 162.  The entries in the Appendix for Pennsylvania 
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are explained in the introduction to the Appendix.  The process of reducing 
the pertinent language of the relevant state laws, which vary in their 
clarity and complexity, to these symbolic representations entails interpretation 
and approximation that cautions against reliance on the individual tabular 
entries without examining the cited legal provisions themselves. 
IV. RESULTS
An examination of the Appendix reveals that express codifications of 
the Goss minimums—designated by a shaded “x” in the “Notice” and 
“Hearing” columns—are relatively infrequent.  Looked at horizontally, 
that is, row by row, the Appendix shows (1) that seven state laws are 
entirely silent on the issue, thereby implicitly incorporating, or at least 
not adding, any procedural protections beyond the constitutional 
minimum of Goss;26 and (2) that approximately an additional ten states’ 
laws only include negligible additions to Goss.27  Thus, approximately 
thirty-three states have statutes or regulations that notably extend beyond 
the procedural due process requirements of Goss.28
The “Notice” columns in the Appendix reveal that the most common 
procedural additions to Goss are notification to the parent (n~25) and 
notification to the superintendent (n~12),29 with several of these state 
laws adding specifications for the contents, timing, and form of this 
notification.30  In addition, approximately five state laws specify a minimum 
of written notice to the student, whereas Goss provided for the alternatives 
correspond to the procedural requirements for the first level, which is for removals of up 
to three days.  See infra notes 161, 162.  For suspensions of four to ten days, the 
regulations additionally require the school to provide an informal conference among the 
student, the parent, and the principal within the first five days of the suspension.  See
infra note 162.  This “hearing” must include the right to question witnesses present 
and to produce witnesses on the student’s behalf.  See infra note 162. 
 26. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, and North Dakota. 
 27. Although “negligible” is only an estimation, these states are Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.
 28. The gradations of “negligibly” and “notably” are not objectively distinguishable.  
Thus, the respective numbers of states in each category are, to a limited extent, only 
approximations.
 29. These numbers are only approximations because they do not include the partial 
entries. 
 30. As unusual additions, Utah’s law requires notice, upon request, to the noncustodial 
parent, and West Virginia requires notice to the school’s faculty senate.  See infra notes
180, 194. 
ZIRKEL 7/6/2009 10:00:34 AM
350
of oral or written notice, and three states require notice to the school 
board.31
The “Hearing” and “Other Hearing Rights” columns of the Appendix 
show that the most common procedural additions to Goss are unconditional 
opportunity for the student’s side of the story (n~20), accompanied in 
approximately half of these states with a corresponding unqualified 
school official’s obligation—without the triggering condition of the 
student denying the charges32—to explain the evidence.33  Less frequently, 
state laws provide the right to appeal to the superintendent (n~7), the 
board (n~5), or both (n~1). 
Finally, the “Additional Levels” column provides the most significant 
expansion of Goss rights by limiting the application of Goss to a 
substantially lower ceiling than ten days and adding stronger PDP rights 
for the remaining period of suspension.  The most notable variations, in 
order of strength, are as follows: (1) Minnesota provides limited additional 
protections for suspensions of six consecutive and eleven cumulative 
days;34 (2) Texas and Pennsylvania provide an intermediate level of PDP 
for suspensions of three to ten and four to ten days, respectively;35 and 
(3) California, Nebraska, and New York effectively redraw the Goss ten-
day boundary between suspensions and expulsions at five days.36  As an 
unusual variation, Tennessee’s law requires the principal to develop a 
behavior improvement plan for the student upon a suspension of six to 
ten days.37  Finally, illustrating the blurry boundary between procedural 
and substantive requirements, the recently amended Connecticut law 
limits out-of-school suspensions of one to ten days to circumscribed 
serious safety grounds, thus effectively collapsing the Goss ceiling to 
zero days for the bulk of disciplinary violations.38
V. DISCUSSION
Almost two-thirds of the states have statutes or regulations that extend 
notably beyond the procedural due process requirements of Goss for out-
 31. Again, this approximation does not include the partial entries. 
32. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 33. As with the prior frequencies, these numbers are conservative approximations, 
which do not include partial entries.  As notable additions, Hawaii, see infra note 84, 
New York, see infra note 146, and Washington, see infra note 188, provide the 
opportunity for the parent’s participation, and unusually, California calls for the 
participation “whenever practicable, [of] the teacher, supervisor, or [referring] school 
employee,” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48911(b) (West 2006). 
34. See infra note 119 and accompanying table. 
35. See infra notes 162, 179 and accompanying table. 
36. See infra notes 65, 134, 147 and accompanying table. 
37. See infra note 175. 
38. See infra note 70 and accompanying table. 
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of-school suspensions of one to ten days.  Most often, states add to the 
basic requirement of notice by requiring recipients beyond the student, 
although states also extend beyond Goss in terms of the content, timing, 
and form of the requisite notification.  Although not overwhelmingly 
onerous, each of these additional requirements represents additional 
inconvenience and—in cases of noncompliance—legal vulnerability for 
the administrative disciplinarian.  On the other side of the balance, 
these requirements provide additional protection and, at least potentially, 
fairness for the affected student.  The most common alteration to the 
hearing procedure articulated in Goss is the removal of the condition 
antecedent to a hearing, that is, the student’s denial of the noticed 
charges.  This alteration is common because the difference between 
providing an explanation of the evidence and giving the student an 
opportunity for rebuttal is not particularly significant; most legislatures 
likely did not notice the difference and most courts are likely to regard 
the difference as de minimis.  In contrast, the effects of adding a right of 
review at the superintendent’s level, the board’s level, or both, are akin to 
those of the varying supplemental notice requirements.  These additional 
levels, which exist in approximately six to eight states’ laws, are the most 
significant extensions of Goss and largely have the effect of reducing the 
ten-day ceiling of its procedural requirements.39  These additional levels 
therefore trigger the more extensive procedural requirements that the Goss
reasoning and state law codifications have reserved for longer exclusions, 
herein referred to generically as “expulsions.” 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the value of experimentation 
among the states, within constitutional boundaries, as one of the benefits 
of federalism.40 The Goss Court provided a relatively non-onerous procedural 
rule as the constitutional minimum for short-term suspension of students 
as one of the primary tools of school discipline.41  Beyond this minimum, 
the substantive requirements that may—as Connecticut’s recent amendments 
 39. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text, along with the entries under 
“Additional Levels” in the Appendix, infra pp. 354–55. 
40. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2786 n.28 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 418 (1999); 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 264–65 (1983); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 617 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Brandeis’s dissenting 
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932), is usually 
credited with the conception of states as laboratories. 
 41. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–83 (1975). 
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illustrate42—reduce the availability of this disciplinary alternative are 
properly a matter for state experimentation.  This Article’s systematic 
canvassing of current state variations thus serves more than one purpose. 
First, these survey data help inform states of what others are doing so 
that they can see what may be considered in, and customized to, their 
respective jurisdictions.  Second, this study builds on predecessor studies 
to provide an added basis and direction for future research.43 For example, a 
useful follow-up study would be to determine the relationship, if any, 
between these statutory findings and the suspension case law in the previous 
two studies. More specifically, it would be beneficial to determine if 
those jurisdictions that have experienced the most frequent and least 
district-friendly decisions correspond closely to the state laws that this 
study revealed as having the most significant extensions of the Goss
requirements.  As a second example, this analysis provides the template for a 
systematic canvassing of state laws with regard to expulsions, generically 
referred to here as exclusions of more than ten days. 
Finally, this study adds to the evidence from its pair of predecessors 
that the characterization of Goss and its judicial progeny as disabling the 
discipline of school students is a misconception.44  Rather, state authorities 
that forge binding rules in the form of legislation and regulations, with 
due allowance for further experimentation and variation at the local 
level, are the primary—and proper—sources of the procedural and 
substantive requirements for student suspensions.  In this modern era of 
judicial deference rather than activist intervention in public school student 
cases,45 state policymaking is both necessary and proper to balance the 
competing interests, which include minimizing the risk of error that 
ultimately may harm both the individual and the institution. 
42. See infra note 70 and accompanying table. 
43. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. 
45. See, e.g., Anastasia D’Angelo & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of 
Student-Initiated Education Litigation: A Comparison of 1977–1981 and 1997–2001 
Decisions, 226 EDUC. L. REP. 539, 550–53 (2008); Perry A. Zirkel, National Trends in 
Education Litigation: Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Students, 27 J.L. & EDUC.
235, 242 (1998).  One of the factors that appeared to influence the courts was the 
increased concern with safety and security in the schools, particularly in the wake of 
Columbine and similar well-publicized incidents within and beyond the schools.  See,
e.g., Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 11, at 379 (citing Robert C. Cloud, Due Process 
and Zero Tolerance: An Uneasy Alliance, 178 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 17 (2003)).  Whether the 
various states’ legislatures and their education agencies will accord this interest the same 
weight and direction, especially in comparison to competing interests—such as the value 
of using alternate disciplinary mechanisms for the limited level of student conduct 
violations that are typically grounds for short-term suspensions—is an open question left 
to the policymaking function of these nonjudicial branches of government. 
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VI. APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF PDP PROVISIONS OF STATE LAWS                                                  
FOR OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS OF                                                                          
ONE TO TEN DAYS46
The Method section explains the basic format and entries for this tabular 
analysis.47  In addition, some entries have these specialized features, which 
are explained in the respective footnotes: 
 “( )” =  implied via indirect language48
 “[ ]” =  partial, or limited, variation49
 “+”  =  limited addition50
 “?”  =  open question51
 46. The entries in the tabular analysis are current as of July 1, 2008. 
47. See supra Part III. 
48. See, e.g., infra notes 55, 56. 
49. See, e.g., infra notes 59, 69. 
50. See, e.g., infra notes 62, 63. 
51. See, e.g., infra notes 56, 64. 















































































































































































Alabama52          
Alaska53         X  
Arizona54    (x)55      (x?)56  x57
Arkansas58   X      x, [X]59
California60 x x, X61 x  X+62 X+63 (x/X?)64 X65
Colorado66   x       x67
Connecticut68 X  X  [x]69 X  x70 x71
Delaware72              
Florida73 x, X x, X74 [X]75  X X  x76
Georgia77 (X)78  (X)79 (x)80 (x)81 x82
Hawaii83 x x, X84 X  x+85 x+86  X87 x88
Idaho89 x x90 [X]91 [X]92  X93
Illinois94   X 95  x [X]96   X97
Indiana98 x X   x X  




X X X  
Kentucky103 x X X  x X  
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Louisiana104 x X  X X x105
Maine106          
Maryland107 [x]108  [x]109   [x]110  [x+]111   x112
Massachusetts113            x114




x118 X X  x119 x120
Mississippi121          
Missouri122 x123  x124 x125 x126 X127 x128   x129




X X X  X134 x135
Nevada136 x  X X  
New
Hampshire137
         




 x144 x   
New York145 X x X+146  X147
North
Carolina148
  x149      
North Dakota150          
Ohio151 X      X152 X153
Oklahoma154         [X]155
Oregon156 x  x157 [X] 158  X [X]159
Pennsylvania160 x X X  [X]161 X  X162
Rhode Island163         (X)164  x165
South
Carolina166
  X167     X168
South Dakota169 x x x  X  X  [x]170
Tennessee171 x X172 x  [x]173  X+174  x175
Texas176   [x]177     [x]178 X179
Utah180   X181      
Vermont182   x183      
Virginia184 x X X  x x x, [X]185
Washington186 x  X  X187 X+188 x, X189 x?190 x191
West Virginia192 x x, X193 X+194 x x (X)195
Wisconsin196 x (x)197 [x]198   x [x]199
Wyoming200 x    X X  
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 52. Alabama regulations define suspensions but do not specify the prerequisite 
procedural requirements, inferably leaving such matters to local school board policy.  
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02 (2008).  The authors acknowledge with appreciation 
the assistance of Doris McQuiddy for confirmation that Alabama school districts develop 
their policies and procedures for suspensions as well as expulsions.  E-mail from Doris 
McQuiddy, Educ. Specialist, Ala. Dep’t of Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. 
and Law, Lehigh Univ. (May 29, 2008) (on file with second author). 
 53. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 06.060 (2009). 
 54. Except for the implied notice requirement, see infra note 55, and the possible 
additional rights, see infra notes 56, 57, the relevant state law defers to school boards “in 
consultation with the teachers and parents of the school district” to “prescribe rules for 
the discipline, suspension and expulsion of pupils,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(B) 
(2008).  However, the law sets the procedural minimum only for suspensions of more 
than ten days and merely mandates that the rules be “consistent with the constitutional 
rights of pupils.”  Id.
 55. In requiring the superintendent to notify the school board within five days of 
all suspensions, the legislation implies that the suspending administrator provide notice 
to the superintendent.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(K).
 56. Quaere whether the connected requirement that the suspension be for “good 
cause” implies a right of appeal to the school board.  Id.  The related requirement for 
access to specified board proceedings, see infra note 57, does not necessarily add to this 
arguable right; if the legislature intended that any board proceeding for suspensions be 
discretionary—in contrast with the explicit right to a board hearing for expulsions—the 
access right is only conditional, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(G). 
 57. For suspensions and expulsions, the legislation also accords the student, 
parents, and their legal counsel the right to attend and have access to the minutes or 
recording of “any executive session pertaining to the proposed disciplinary action.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(H). 
 58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-507(f)(1) (2007). 
 59. The Arkansas legislation only allows for appeals to the school board if the 
superintendent initiates the suspension.  Id. § 6-18-507(c)(2). 
 60. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48911 (West 2009). 
 61. In addition to requiring written notice to the parents regarding the suspension 
decision, at the time of the decision, the suspending administrator must make reasonable 
efforts to contact the parents in person or by telephone.  Id. § 48911(d).
 62. The administrator must have an informal conference with not only the student, 
but also “whenever practicable, [with] the teacher, supervisor, or [referring] school 
employee.”  Id. § 48911(b). 
 63. Id.
 64. Quaere whether the requirement that the suspending administrator report the 
suspension—with the reason for the suspension—to the superintendent or board implies 
a right of appeal to said level.  Id. § 48911(e).
 65.  California law treats suspensions of six days or more as expulsions, which 
separately have more formal rights, including, inter alia, written notice and a hearing 
with right to counsel.  Id. §§ 48911(a), 48918.   
 66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-105 (2008). 
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 67. The Colorado legislation requires, as a prerequisite to the suspended student’s 
readmission, a meeting between the student, parent, and suspending administrator to 
discuss the “need to develop a remedial discipline plan for the pupil in an effort to 
prevent further disciplinary action.”  Id. § 22-33-105(3)(b)(II).   
 68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233c (Supp. 2008). 
 69. Connecticut law requires providing the student with the reasons for the 
suspension, which equate more with notice of the charges than an explanation of the 
evidence.  Id. § 10-233c(a). 
 70. The state law provides that “no pupil shall be suspended more than ten times or 
a total of fifty days in one school year, whichever results in fewer days of exclusion, 
unless such pupil is granted a formal hearing.”  Id.  Additionally and more significantly, 
an amendment to said statute, effective July 1, 2008, requires that schools replace out-of-
school suspensions—as contrasted with expulsions—with in-school suspensions, except 
when the administration determines that the student “poses such a danger to persons or 
property or such a disruption of the educational process” to justify out-of-school 
suspension.  Id. § 10-233c(g).  The state education agency, pursuant to the directive in 
the amendment, has issued guidelines for this determination.  CONN. STATE DEP’T OF 
EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR IN-SCHOOL AND OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/pressroom/In_School_Suspension_ 
Guidance.pdf.  Finally and peripherally, a Connecticut regulation requires “prompt 
referral to a planning and placement team of all children who have been suspended 
repeatedly.”  CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76d-7 (2008). 
 71. The state law provides that “no pupil shall be suspended more than ten times or 
a total of fifty days in one school year, whichever results in fewer days of exclusion, 
unless such pupil is granted a formal hearing.”  Id. § 10-233c(a).  
 72. Delaware does not have relevant legislation or regulations.  More specifically, 
“Delaware has not enacted any statutory or regulatory provisions which either repeat or 
add to the Goss notice and hearing requirements.”  E-mail from Mary L. Cooke, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., Del., to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (June 13, 
2008) (on file with second author).  Previously, the state education department issued 
nonbinding guidelines that recommended oral notice and a written decision that included 
the charges, evidence, sanction, and right to internal appeal, first to the superintendent, 
then to the board.  WILLIAM B. KEENE, DEL. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION,
GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRICT POLICIES ON STUDENT RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 10–11 (1988), available at http://www.doe.k12.de.us/infosuites/ 
students_family/climate/files/climate_Codes_Conduct_1992.pdf.  However, recently the 
state education department issued its intention, see 12 Del. Reg. Regs. 219 (Aug. 1, 
2008), available at http://regulations.delaware.gov/register/august2008/final/12%20DE 
%20Reg%20219%2008-01-08.pdf, to amend title 14, section 605 of the Delaware 
Administrative Code, which requires school districts to keep local rights and responsibilities 
policies on file with the state department of education, so as to delete reference to these 
guidelines, DEL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 605 (2008), available at http://regulations. 
delaware.gov/AdminCode/title14/600/605.pdf.
 73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.09(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). 
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 74. Florida’s legislation requires the suspending administrator to make “a good 
faith effort to immediately inform a student’s parent by telephone” and to report the 
suspension and its reason “within 24 hours to the student’s parent by United States 
mail.”  Id. 
 75. This requirement also applies to school bus suspensions.  Id.
 76. Florida also requires the principal or the principal’s designee to make a “good 
faith effort . . . to employ parental assistance or other alternative measures prior to 
suspension, except in the case of emergency or disruptive conditions which require 
immediate suspension or in the case of a serious breach of conduct as defined by rules of 
the district school board.”  Id.  Additionally, Florida, by regulation, has special provisions for 
suspension of students who are prosecuted for a felony off school property that has an 
adverse impact on the educational process.  FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-1.0956 (2008). 
 77. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738 (2005).  In line with its specific provisions, see 
infra notes 78–79, this statute authorizes the principal or the principal’s designee to 
suspend the student “consistent with any applicable procedural requirements of the 
Constitutions of the United States and this state and after considering the use of any 
appropriate student support services,” GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738(e)(1).   
 78. The written notice and other Goss-plus protections are a requisite step after the 
teacher’s removal of the student from class.  GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-738(b), (c).  
Arguably, these minimums would seem to implicitly apply when an administrator 
removes the student from school.  See id. § 20-2-738(e)(2). 
 79. §§ 20-2-738(b), (c).
 80. Id.
 81. Id.
 82. In addition to the notable right of a teacher to remove a child from the 
classroom, the Georgia statute also establishes a placement review committee that serves 
as an intermediate step between the teacher’s removal of the student and the exercise of 
the principal’s suspension options.  Id. §§ 20-2-738(d), (e). 
 83. HAW. CODE R. §§ 8-19-6, -8 (Weil 2008). 
 84. The rules require the school to provide the parents with initial notice by 
telephone “if feasible” and, upon completion of the required investigation, written notice.  
Id. § 8-19-8(d).  In addition, the rules require the principal “to attempt to confirm the 
[written] notice by telephoning the parent.”  Id.  Although unclear whether it repeats the 
first step or serves as an intermediate step, the rules also require the principal to notify 
the parents “[u]pon preliminary investigation and findings.”  Id. § 8-19-8(a). 
 85. The required elements of the written parental notice include a statement “[t]hat 
the parent may request a conference with the principal or designee,” thus providing the 
parent with at least an equivalent right.  Id. § 8-19-8(d)(4).
 86. Id.
 87. Hawaii’s rules trigger the more formal procedural protections of expulsion 
upon the accumulation of eleven or more days of suspension.  Id. § 8-19-8(c).
 88. For the Goss-type notice and hearing for the student, the rules require the 
principal to request the parents to participate “where the student is unable to understand 
the seriousness of the charges, the nature of the proceedings, and consequences thereof, 
or is of such age, intelligence or experience as to make meaningful discussion difficult.”  
Id. § 8-19-8(b).  More generally, the rules require counseling of the student in connection 
with each suspension.  Id. § 8-19-6(g). 
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 89. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-205 (2008).  We acknowledge with appreciation the 
assistance of attorney Elaine Eberharter-Maki in ascertaining the pertinent state law of 
Idaho.  E-mail from Elaine Eberharter-Maki, Att’y, Eberharter-Maki & Tappen’s Boise, 
Idaho Office, to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (June 9, 
2008) (on file with second author).  
 90. “The board of trustees [of the school district] shall be notified of any temporary 
suspensions, the reasons therefor, and the response, if any, thereto.”  § 33-205. 
 91. The required “informal hearing” specifies that the principal must provide the 
student with the reasons for the suspension, which—corresponding more closely to the 
charges—do not necessarily equate fully with an explanation of the evidence.  Id.   
 92. Similarly, the requirement is “the opportunity to challenge [the] reasons.”  Id.
 93. At any one of the following applicable limits, the more formal notice and 
hearing requirements for an expulsion apply: (1) the principal suspends the student for 
more than five days; (2) the superintendent extends the suspension by an additional ten 
days; or (3) the school board extends the suspension by an additional five days because 
the suspended student poses a risk to the health, welfare, or safety of other pupils.  Id.
 94. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-22.6(b) (West 2006). 
 95. The notice to the student’s parents or guardian must include “a full statement 
of the reasons for [] suspension and a notice of their right to [school board] review.”  Id.
 96. As in Idaho, see supra note 91, this right appears to be partial, based on the 
connected notice-of-reasons requirement, § 5/10-22.6(b). 
 97. If the parents exercise this required appeals opportunity, then they have the 
right to appear and participate at the school board review.  § 5/10-22.6(b). 
 98. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-18(b) (West 2008). 
 99. IOWA CODE § 282.4(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2008).   
 100. This procedural requirement is the only one specified in the Iowa legislation and—
along with the teacher’s, principal’s, and superintendent’s authorities for suspensions—
the requirement is conditioned upon the school board’s delegation.  Id.
 101. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8902(b), (c) (2002). 
 102. In addition to the immediate oral notice, the legislation requires that written 
notice, including the reasons for suspension, be given to the student and the student’s 
parent within twenty-four hours.  Id. § 72-8902(c). 
 103. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150(5), (6) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008). 
 104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416 (2001 & Supp. 2009).   
 105. Id. § 17:416(C). 
 106. The Maine legislation merely requires “proper investigation of a student’s 
behavior” and “due process proceedings” for student suspensions and expulsions.  
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 1001(9) (2008).
 107. The Maryland legislation only provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he student or 
the student’s parent or guardian promptly shall be given a conference with the principal 
and any other appropriate personnel during the suspension period.”  MD. CODE ANN.,




ZIRKEL 7/6/2009 10:00:34 AM
360
                                                                                                                                
 111. Id.
 112. The Maryland regulations provide a narrowly circumscribed right to appeal to 
the State Board of Education.  MD. CODE REGS. 13A.01.05.05 (2009). 
 113. The Massachusetts legislation generally requires each school district to have 
policies that provide “disciplinary proceedings, including procedures assuring due process” 
and “standards and procedures for suspension and expulsion of students.”  MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37H (West 1996). 
 114. This legislation only specifies procedural prerequisites in cases of student 
felonies. Id. § 37H1/2. 
 115. Michigan’s legislation authorizes the school board and administrators to suspend 
students for “gross misdemeanor or persistent disobedience,” but it does not specify any 
relevant procedural prerequisites.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311(1) (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2008).  Michigan has a separate statute that authorizes teachers to suspend students 
from a class, subject, or activity.  Id. § 380.1309.  Although this statute unusually allows 
such action “for up to 1 full school day,” id., the chart does not include the specified 
procedural requirements due to the aforementioned exclusion, see supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
 116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.46 (West 2008). 
 117. The written notice, which must be served on the student at or before the time 
the suspension is to take effect, must include “the grounds for suspension, a brief 
statement of the facts, a description of the testimony, a readmission plan, and a copy of 
the [relevant statutory provisions].”  Id. § 121A.46(3). 
 118. The district must make reasonable efforts to notify parents by telephone as 
soon as possible and must send the parents a copy of the student’s written notice within 
forty-eight hours.  Id.
 119. For suspensions beyond five days, the suspending administrator must provide 
the superintendent with a reason for the suspension. Id. § 121A.41(10).  Moreover, if the 
suspension, whatever its length, would result in the student missing more than ten 
cumulative days in a school year, the district must make reasonable efforts to meet with 
the student and the student’s parent, and with the parent’s permission, conduct a mental 
health screening of the student.  Id. § 121A.45(3).
 120. The readmission plan, which is treated as permissive in this part of the 
statute—although subsequently seemingly mandatory by implication, see supra note 
117—“must not obligate a parent to provide a sympathomimetic medication for the 
parent’s child as a condition of readmission,” § 121A.41(10). 
 121. Mississippi’s legislation requires each school board to adopt a code of student 
conduct, including “[p]rocedures to be followed for acts requiring discipline, including 
suspensions and expulsion, which comply with due process requirements.”  MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 37-11-55 (1999 & Supp. 2007).
 122. The Missouri legislation uses the term suspension generically—without any 
mention of expulsion—for removals for up to 180 days, distinguishing procedurally 
between those for up to ten days and those for more than ten days only indirectly in 
terms of the respective authority of principals and superintendents.  MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 167.171 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).  The requirements coded herein are those for 
removals by the principal, thus suspensions of up to ten days.  Id.
 123. Id. § 167.171(2). 
 124. Id. § 167.161(1). 
 125. Id.
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 126. § 167.171(2). 
 127. Id.
 128. Id. § 167.171(1).  This right of appeal is a de facto result of the requirement 
that suspensions by the principals—those up to ten days—be “immediately reported to 
the superintendent who may revoke [them] at any time.”  Id.
 129. Additionally, a separate statute provides specific hearing requirements for a 
pupil who “poses a threat of harm to such pupil or others, as evidenced by the prior 
conduct of such pupil.”  § 167.161(1).   
 130. The specifically relevant provision in the Montana legislation merely requires 
the school board to “adopt a policy defining the authority and procedure to be used . . . in 
suspending a pupil.”  MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-202 (2007); see id. §§ 20-4-402, -4-403,
-5-202. The only other procedural provision is for the limited situation in which a school 
does not have a superintendent or principal, whereupon the teacher has the authority to 
suspend the student, but it must “notify the trustees and the county superintendent 
immediately of the action.”  Id. § 20-4-302(5). 
 131. Montana’s regulations require that each school “maintain a record of any 
disciplinary action that is educationally related [including suspensions], with explanation, 
taken against the student.”  MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.55.910 (2007). 
 132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-265 (2003). 
 133. The principal must send written notice to the student and the parent within 
twenty-four hours of the suspension.  Id.
 134. Without further differentiation for suspensions exceeding ten days, the statute 
provides that suspensions exceeding five days require more formal procedural protections, 
including the right to a formal hearing with counsel and witnesses.  Id. § 79-268.
 135. Prior to a “short-term” suspension, the principal must make “an investigation 
of the alleged conduct or violation and [determine] that such suspension is necessary to 
help any student, to further school purposes, or to prevent an interference with school 
purposes.” Id. § 79-265(b)(2).  Prior to the end of the suspension, the principal must 
make “a reasonable effort to hold a conference with the parent or guardian before or at 
the time the student returns to school.”  Id. § 79-265(b)(5). 
 136. NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.467(2) (2007). 
 137. The legislation that authorizes student suspensions does not specify procedural 
prerequisites.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:13 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 138. N.J ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2 (2008). 
 139. The school must provide this parental notice prior to the end of the school day 
on which the administrator makes the suspension decision.  Id. § 6A:16-7.2(a)(3).  
Additionally, the notice has various required elements, and it must include “[t]he 
provision(s) of the code of student conduct the student is accused of violating” as well as 
“[t]he student’s due process rights, pursuant to [the state regulations].”  Id.
 140. The chief school administrator must report the suspension to the district board 
of education at its next regular meeting.  Id. § 6A:16-7.2(b). 
 141. The chief school administrator must annually report specified discipline 
information, including the number of suspensions, to both the local and the state board of 
education. Id. § 6A:16-7.1(a).  
 142. N.M. CODE R. § 6.11.2.12(D)(2) (Weil 2001). 
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 143. The relevant regulation provides:  
The school shall exert reasonable efforts to inform the student’s parent of the 
charges against the student and their possible or actual consequence as soon as 
practicable.  If the school has not communicated with the parent by telephone 
or in person by the end of the first full day of suspension, the school shall on 
that day mail a written notice with the required information to the parent’s 
address of record. 
Id.
 144. The regulations clarify that the suspending administrator “is not required to 
divulge the identity of informants, although (s)he should not withhold such information 
without good cause.”  Id.     
 145. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3214 (McKinney Supp. 2009). 
 146. New York provides the student and parents with the right, upon request, to “an 
informal conference with the principal at which the pupil and/or person in parental 
relation shall be authorized to present the pupil’s version of the event and to ask 
questions of the complaining witnesses.”  Id. § 3214(3)(b)(1).   
 147. New York law treats suspensions of six days or more effectively as expulsions, 
according expelled students the rights, inter alia, of “reasonable notice,” legal 
representation, and cross-examination.  Id. § 3214(3)(c)(1).  New York does not have 
any subsequent, differentiating level for removals of more than ten days. 
 148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(b) (2007). 
 149. The statute clarifies that “[t]he notice [to the parents] shall be given by telephone, 
telefax, e-mail, or any other method reasonably designed to achieve actual notice.”  Id.
 150. Without specifying any procedural requirements, North Dakota’s statute 
delegates authority to school boards to develop rules regarding suspensions and 
expulsions.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-09 (Supp. 2007).
 151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66(A) (West Supp. 2007). 
 152. The legislation provides students with the opportunity to appear at an informal 
hearing to “challenge the reason for the intended suspension or otherwise to explain 
[their] actions.”  Id.
 153. Id. § 3313.661(A). 
 154. The Oklahoma legislation requires districts to develop policies, including 
procedures, for student suspensions, but the only specified procedure is the right of 
appeal to a district panel.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-101.3 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2009).
 155. Districts must create a policy that determines an appeals panel for suspension 
and expulsions.  Id. § 24-101.3(A).  The panel may be a committee made up of teachers, 
district administrators, or both, or the panel may be the district board of education.  Id.
§ 24-101.3(B)(1). 
 156. OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0065 (2008). 
 157. This notice must include “the conditions for reinstatement, and appeal 
procedures, where applicable.”  Id.
 158. Oregon’s regulations require “specification of [the] charges,” which does not 
appear to equate fully to an explanation of the evidence.  Id.
 159. The regulations provide the school board, not the parent, with the right of final 
review, and this is seemingly only when the “executive officer of the school district or 
designated representative” makes the suspension decision.  Id.
 160. 22 PA. CODE §§ 12.6(b), 12.8(b), (c) (2009). 
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 161. Pennsylvania’s regulations require providing the student with the reasons for 
the suspension, which equate more with notice of the charges than an explanation of the 
evidence.  Id. § 12.6(b). 
 162. For suspensions of four to ten days, the regulations require providing an 
informal conference among the student, the parent, and the principal within the first five 
days of the suspension.  Id. §§ 12.6(b)(1)(iv), 12.8(c).  This “hearing” must include the 
right to question witnesses present and to produce witnesses on the student’s behalf.  Id.
§ 12.8(c).  The regulations provide a further, more formal level of hearing for removals 
of more than ten days.  Id. § 12.8(b).   
 163. Rhode Island’s “safe school” legislation authorizes the school committee, or a 
school principal as designated by the school committee, to suspend “disruptive” students, 
but it does not specify the procedural requirements beyond a multistep right of appeal.  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-2-17(a), (b) (1996).  The legislation includes a definition of 
“disruptive.”  Id. § 16-2-17(a). 
 164. When the delegated school principal issues the suspension, the statute is not 
clear whether there is a right to appeal to the board.  It may be alternatively argued that 
the principal and the board for such action are effectively the same or that the specified 
higher levels imply full exhaustion from the principal to the board.  Id. § 16-2-17(b); see 
infra note 165. 
 165. The Rhode Island legislation provides the successive appellate rights to “the 
[state] commissioner of elementary and secondary education,” “the [state] board of 
regents for elementary and secondary education,” and “the family court for the county in 
which the school is located.”  § 16-2-17(b). 
 166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-230 (2004).
 167. Written notice must include the reasons for the suspension and provide the 
parents with an opportunity for a meeting with the administrator within three days of the 
suspension.  Id.
 168. The aforementioned meeting with the administrator must be exhausted to 
trigger this right to appeal to “the board of trustees or to its authorized agent.”  Id.
 169. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-32-4, -4.2 (2004). 
 170. After stating that school boards “may authorize the summary suspension of 
pupils by principals of schools for not more than ten school days,” South Dakota’s 
legislation then appears to give the superintendent, not the parent, the right of review, 
specifically providing: “Any suspension by a principal shall be immediately reported to 
the superintendent who may revoke the suspension at any time.”  Id. § 13-32-4.2.   
 171. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401(a) to (c) (2002 & Supp. 2007).
 172. The required notice to both the parents and the superintendent must include 
“[t]he cause for the suspension” and “[t]he conditions for readmission, which may include, at 
the request of either party, a meeting of the parent or guardian, student and principal.”  
Id. § 49-6-3401(c). 
 173. The required information is limited to “the nature of the student’s misconduct.”  
Id.
 174. As a prerequisite to suspension, the legislation additionally requires the 
suspending administrator’s affirmative act of questioning the student.  Id.
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 175. The legislation provides as follows: “If the suspension is for more than five (5) 
days, the principal shall develop and implement a plan for improving the behavior which 
shall be made available for review by the [superintendent] upon request.”  Id.
 176. TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001, 37.005, 37.009 (Vernon 2006).  We 
acknowledge with appreciation the assistance of attorney Christopher Borreca in 
confirming that Texas legislation focuses its procedural protections on suspensions of 
more than two days.  E-mail from Chris Borreca, Att’y, Houston Office of Thompson & 
Horton, LLP, to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (May 28, 
2008) (on file with second author). 
 177. Texas’s legislation requires the school board to “address the notification of a 
student’s parent or guardian of a violation of the student code of conduct committed by 
the student that results in suspension.”  TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.001(a)(6) (Vernon 
2006).
 178. The legislation leaves the right of appeal within the discretion of the district 
via its policy.  Id. § 37.009(a). 
 179. For suspensions of three to ten days, Texas legislation provides:  
[T]he principal or other appropriate administrator shall schedule a conference 
among the principal or other appropriate administrator, a parent or guardian of 
the student, the teacher removing the student from class, if any, and the student.  At 
the conference, the student is entitled to written or oral notice of the reasons for 
the removal, an explanation of the basis for the removal, and an opportunity to 
respond to the reasons for the removal.  The student may not be returned to the 
regular classroom pending the conference.    
Id.
 180. Utah’s legislation delegates suspension policies to school boards “consistent 
with due process and other provisions of law,” with the only specifically required 
procedure being notice to the custodial parent.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-903 (2006 & 
Supp. 2008).
 181. Additionally, the legislation requires notice to the noncustodial parent 
upon written request from such parent.  Id. § 53A-11-903(1)(b)(i). 
 182. Vermont legislation simply provides “standard due process procedures for 
suspension and expulsion of a student.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a(a)(7) (2004).  
The only exception is the specific requirement that the school’s discipline plan include 
procedures for “notifying parents of student misconduct.”  Id. § 1161a(a)(3). 
 183. § 1161a(a)(3). 
 184. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.04 (2006). 
 185. It is not clear whether the school board policy may limit this right, given the 
following language in the statute: “The decision of the division superintendent or his 
designee may be appealed to the school board or a committee thereof in accordance with 
regulations of the school board . . . .”  Id.
 186. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392-400-245, -250 (2007). 
 187. Washington’s regulations require that the notice also include an explanation of 
“the corrective action or punishment which may be imposed.”  Id. § 392-400-250.  
 188. The regulations additionally provide that “[a]ny student, parent, or guardian 
who is aggrieved by the imposition of [a short-term suspension] shall have the right to an 
informal conference with the building principal or his or her designee for the purpose of 
resolving the grievance.” Id. § 392-400-240; see also id. § 392-400-245 (referring to 
short-term suspensions). 
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189. The student or parent may appeal successively to the principal, the superintendent,
and then the school board.  § 392-400-240. 
190. The regulations in one part separate suspensions into those for one day and
those for more than one day—presumably two to ten days—with the only distinction 
appearing to be with regard to the parent’s right to notice and an informal conference.  Id.
§ 392-400-250(2).  Yet, the prefatory part of the same regulation seems to provide these rights,
by cross-reference, for suspensions of one to ten days generally.  See § 392-400-250.
191. The regulations condition suspensions on “a general rule”: “[N]o student shall
be suspended unless another form of corrective action or punishment reasonably 
calculated to modify [the student’s] conduct has previously been imposed upon the 
student as a consequence of misconduct of the same nature.” Id. § 392-400-245(2).  This 
requirement has a provision for exceptional circumstances, which includes the school 
district’s consultation with an ad hoc citizens committee.  Id.  The regulations also limit the 
total number of days a student may be suspended based on age: students in kindergarten 
through grade four may miss no more than ten days per semester or trimester, while 
students in grades five and above may miss no more than fifteen days per semester or 
trimester.  Id. § 392-400-245(4) to (5).  Finally, the regulations expressly permit school 
boards to establish one or more “student disciplinary boards composed of students, 
teachers, administrators, or parents, or any combination thereof.”  Id. § 392-400-220. 
192. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-5-1a(d) (LexisNexis 2007).
193. The legislation specifically provides that the parent “shall be given telephonic
notice, if possible, of this informal hearing, which notice shall briefly state the grounds 
for suspension.”  Id.  The legislation also requires that written notice be sent to the parent 
on the same day the suspension was decided upon “by regular United States mail.”  Id.
194. The legislation additionally requires that the written notice be provided to “the
county superintendent and to the faculty senate of the school.”  Id.
195. Not appearing to distinguish procedurally between suspensions of one to ten
days and expulsions or other removals beyond ten consecutive days, the legislation 
provides for a board hearing with the various associated more formal protections, 
including the right to counsel.  Id. § 18A-5-1a(f).  In the case of a suspension, this 
proceeding is inferably by way of an appeal.  Id.
196. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 120.13(1) (West 2004).
197. The requirement for parental notice when a teacher removes the student from
class suggests that the same requirement exists when a student is suspended from school. 
Id. § 120.13(1)(a)(4). 
198. The required information is “the reason for the proposed suspension,” which
does not equate fully with an explanation of the evidence.  Id. § 120.13(1)(b)(3). 
199. The legislation limits suspensions to no more than five days for certain
offenses, but it does not specify additional procedural prerequisites until the expulsion 
stage.  Id. § 120.13(1)(b)(2). 
200. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-305 (2007).
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